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The  search  for scientific truth is never ending.  Society’s knowledge base at any time is 
tentative and is advanced, modified, or remains unchanged with the findings of scientific 
research.  In society, the daily lives of human beings are guided by policies established based 
upon knowledge acquired over time.  Great trust is placed in the hands of the policy makers 
who  accept  the research findings which are considered scientific truths.  Historically, the 
problem facing society is that ideology dominates that which is epistemologically relevant.  
Many research findings are deemed false not on the basis of the incorrectness of the findings 
but  on  ideological  grounds.    Consensual  correctness  is  considered  the  basis  for  research 
acceptance rather than representational correctness.  The history of astronomy and economics 
reveals the force of ideology in the cases of Copernicus, Galileo, Samuel Bailey and P. W. S. 
Andrews.    The  issue  in  philosophy  is  much  more  difficult,  as  exemplified  by  Hobbes' 
argument  against  Aristotle’s  philosophy.    However, Hobbes' position is reinforced by the 
formidable work of Mandeville, whose work is the foundation for the ever-popular work of 
Adam Smith.  This paper, in a historical setting, explores issues in several disciplines whereby 
human  beings  are  exposed  unnecessarily  to  the  vagaries  of  those  researchers  who  permit 
ideology  to  dominate  epistemology.    A  corrective  factor--the  fairness  concept--is 
recommended to modify/ameliorate the impact of ideology.  
 
 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
            Truth is independent of belief and scientific research presumably is a quest for truth 
[Salvary 1989, xi].  While scientific theories are comprehensive, they can never be complete 
because our knowledge base is expanding with each new scientific finding.  In the conduct of 
scientific  investigations,  epistemological  relevance  is  the  one  significant  criterion  which 
guide scientists (scholars) in the pre-selection of facts, hypotheses, and explanatory methods.  
Notwithstanding this fact, there are many instances where ideology dominates epistemology.  
In those instances the criterion used in the exploration of scientific issues and the judgment 
of scientific findings is consensual correctness as opposed to representational correctness.  
Consensual  correctness  ensures  a  minimum  amount  of  revision  to  the  core  of  scientific 
knowledge  and  maintains  the  status  quo;  while  representational  correctness,  which  is 
resisted, usually displaces part of the core of the existing body of knowledge.   
            This treatise focuses on the role of the concept of fairness in maintaining the delicate 
balance between ideology and epistemology.  The study’s concern is of great importance  
2 
since the members of society “are guided in their moral responses and intuitions by the 
inherited, accepted suggestiveness of the concepts by which they live [Gellner 1988,124]."  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is divided into ten sections: Science, Ideology, and Epistemology; 
Society  and  the  Concept  of  Fairness;  Ideological  Dominance  and  Epistemological 
Relevance; Astronomy, Economics, Philosophy and Physics; Economics - Modelling and 
Theory Formulation; Instrumentalism; The Free Market and The Regulated Market; Business 
Education; Operationalizing the Fairness Concept; and Conclusion. 
 
2 - SCIENCE, IDEOLOGY, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
            Science  seeks  to  discover  the  structures  underlying  the  world  as  they  manifest 
themselves to us through our senses.  It attempts to make explicit the intricate connections 
and regularities which are the structural causes for the actions and events that are observed.  
Ideology serves as the means of defining and communicating the nature of moral obligations 
[Wuthnow  1987,145].    It  is  a  subjective  thought-construct  [Williams  1988,105],  which 
simply focuses on conditioning to attain a submission to the rules of an established order 
[Williams 1988,101,102].  Thus, when confrontation is chosen by any society as the modus 
operandi, it does not mean that confrontation is better than cooperation.  However, it must be 
emphasized that ideology of itself is not bad; but the manner in which (and time when) it is 
used can produce serious negative social consequences.   
            Knowledge grounded in observations and reasoning through our senses is the essence 
of epistemology.  Since interpretations of human observations and intuitions constitute the 
basis of epistemology, absolute freedom from ideology is not possible [Williams 1988,105].  
The role of ideology in determining lifestyles cannot be denied.  However, ideology should 
not  be  permitted  to  dominate  investigations  of  a  scientific  nature,  because  invariably 
ideology is used to provide a moral cloak for a particular view.   
            The  ideological  connection  of  capitalism,  the  free  market,  and  freedom  serves to 
sustain  the  conviction  that  members  of  the  society  are  acting  as  morally  responsible 
individuals  when  they  accept  the  end  result  of  a  free  marketplace.    This  set  of  cultural 
construction--the  illusion  of  a  self-maintaining  market  as  an  objective  oracle  [Gellner 
1988,186]--gives us the impression that there are certain economic forces which we cannot  
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expect to control because they are simply the laws of nature [Wuthnow 1987,89].   
             In medieval Europe, the developing capitalism borrowed from religion (habits of 
self-denial  by  focusing  on  future  gains,  avoidance  of  self-indulgence).    Along  with  the 
emergence  of  a  growing  technological  resourcefulness,  capitalism  cloaked  with  morality 
engendered  confidence  because  of  its  success  in  providing  gains.    However,  by  the 
seventeenth century, capitalism became purely a money-making system with no definable 
ends or purposes beyond its own further expansion [Mumford 1961,415]. 
            Ideologies not only articulate ideas about moral obligations, but they reinforce these 
obligations and thereby influence or control the manner in which social resources may be 
expended or distributed [Wuthnow 1987,345].  For instance, in order to legitimize capitalism 
as  the  sole  means  to  attain freedom,  one  can appreciate the equating of capitalism with 
freedom.  While the market is identified with freedom of choice, technology is presented as 
providing the greatest means for enlarging freedom [Wuthnow 1987,145] and mergers are 
held to be the means by which the economic system is made efficient. 
            Unequivocally,  society  has  enjoyed  many  benefits  from  technology  and  mergers; 
nevertheless,  they  have  become  ends  in  themselves.    Unfortunately,  the  significant 
redundancy of human beings in the work force due to the rapid technological advances, 
which are not mastered by society, is justified on moral grounds as the working of the natural 
law as embodied in the free market. 
 
3 - SOCIETY AND THE CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS 
 
            The devastating consequences of self-interest, which individuals in pre-society had 
experienced, constituted the precise motivating force for trying to find a means for the future 
avoidance of such consequences.  The communal approach--a symbiotic relationship with 
synergistic  effects--proved  to  be  better  than  the  individual  approach,  whereby  each  one 
fought each other and faced the hazards of nature alone.  Thus, the emergence of society as 
an organized form of human existence was based upon the awareness of the benefits to be 
obtained from cooperation.  Fairness was the impetus for the emergence of society.   
            This paper argues that “fairness” is the foundation of society; however, the existence 
of society does not of itself guarantee fairness.  It is only through cooperation among the  
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members of society that fairness can be attained.  Imagine if, instead of 'self-interest' being 
advocated  as  a  natural  law,  the  "fairness  concept"  had  been  espoused  as  a  necessary 
imperative  for  society--necessary  for  its  civil  continuation.    To  argue  that  this  author  is 
simply introducing the author's ideology in place of another is simply to ignore the force that 
propelled  society  into  existence.    Yet  one  can  interpret  cooperation  as  a  selfish  notion.  
Arguing  from  a  psychological  point  of  view,  Mandeville  [1732]  maintained  that  human 
beings in all their actions (including acts of altruism and even of compassion) are guided by 
selfish motivations.  Mandeville also argued that: (i) the formation of society itself is based 
upon a selfish notion, (ii) those who govern master the art of flattery, and (iii) from all of the 
selfishness (vices) manifested in the acts of individuals, immense public benefits emerge.  
Points (ii) and (iii) of Mandeville’s argument are witnessed in many instances.  However, 
point  (i)  does  not  hold,  since  by  definition  selfishness  signifies  the  benefiting  by  a  few 
members  of  society  at  the  expense  of  the  other  members.    All  members  of  society  are 
expected to benefit from society and have benefited in varying degrees.  Society engenders a 
cooperative  effort  to  the  benefit  of  its  members.    "Fairness"  was  the  means  by  which 
individuals were able to avoid or minimize the intrusive and abusive force of the powerful 
self-interested tyrants.    
            The  concept  of  “fairness"  has  faded  into  oblivion  simply  because  it  was  never 
expounded  as  an  ideology.    Religion  was  the  more  likely  means  to  have  “fairness” 
propagated as an ideology, but religion manifested its own agenda.  With religion pursuing 
its  own  self-interest,  the  "fairness”  concept  never  had  a  fighting  chance.    However,  our 
senses should not be numbed by the past, it is time to recognize the need to embrace the 
concept of fairness with its all-important role as a modifying influence on our every action.  
            Invariably,  each  country  sanctions  a  particular  ideology  as  official  doctrine 
[Wuthnow 1987,177].  Pursuing what is in one's best interest seems morally appropriate; 
however, when self-interest constitutes the dominant concept of the socialization process, the 
inevitable result would be anarchy.  In the long run, indifference to the concept of “fairness” 
will undermine the viability of the social system. 
            Indubitably, the acquisition of knowledge and the extension of the knowledge base of 
the social system is unduly influenced and becomes severely limited by the concept of 'self- 
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interest'.  It is quite clear, in the case of the history of religion (with the clergy in pursuit of 
its own best interest) and scientific research, that ideology simply dominates epistemology. 
 
4 - IDEOLOGICAL DOMINANCE AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELEVANCE 
 
            During  and  after  the  Middle  Ages,  religious  belief  strongly  influenced  scientific 
writing.
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    "Boyle  and  his  colleagues  [were  forced  to  write]  ...  at  length  defending  their 
scientific  enterprises  to  the  theologians  and  couched  much  of  their  philosophy  in  terms 
deferential to and influenced by theologians" for fear that natural philosophy would appear 
opposed  to  the  Christian  religion.    Leibniz  attempted  to  use  Newton's  shortcomings  on 
biblical  chronology to associate Newton's Principia "with an atheist's plot to subvert the 
world of learning and then the world of political stability" [Redwood 1976,98].  Hobbes was 
not daunted by that force and considered the possibility that the senses deceive us [Redwood 
1976,100].  On this type of deception “ . . . no one has spoken more eloquently . . . than 
Galileo [who maintained that] . . .  to accept the idea of a moving earth one must overcome 
the strong impression that one can ‘see’ that the sun is really moving” [Holton 1973,59].  It 
is this line of reasoning that led Hobbes [1651] to criticize Aristotle's natural philosophy.  
Hobbes, given the many wars in England and Europe, felt Aristotle (also aware of many 
wars--Grecian and pre-Grecian) knew his philosophy to be false since it was repugnant to 
natural reason; but Aristotle continued to profess it in order to be consonant with the then 
religious setting [Hobbes 1651(1987),39,41] and, of course, being fearful of having to take 
the same holiday as did Socrates.   
            Hobbes found great fault with the familiar Aristotelian view that man by nature is a 
social  (pre-programmed)  animal.    Man  unlike  bees  and  ants,  which  are  internally 
programmed  for  social  behavior,  is  a  quarrelsome  creature  with  an  inclination  to  "envy, 
hatred and war."  Hobbes' thesis was firmly grounded in the psychological observations that: 
(a) man is envious by nature and (b) obtains great pleasure by ranking himself above other 
men.  To compound this problem of the psychologically disruptive forces within the human 
animal, (1) there is a scarcity of the means of survival in the external world, and (2) the state 
of nature is characterized by the absence of property rights; this latter condition places no 
proscription  on  one  man's  right  to  another  man's  material  possessions  [Moss  1977,259].   
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Hobbes' summarized view of human nature is that there are three principal causes of quarrel: 
(i) competition, (ii) mistrust, and (iii) glory.  "The first makes them invade for gain; the 
second, for safety; and [the] third, for reputation" [Moss 1977,260].  Today, there is much 
more  evidence  on  Hobbes'  position  (e.g.,  ranking--third  world  countries;  developing 
countries' freedom to decide means accepting the decisions of the powerful countries). 
            One  may  contend  that  Hobbes  view  was  fundamentally  unhistorical  and 
psychologically simplistic.  To the contrary, such a contention is refuted by the arguments 
presented by Mandeville [1732,323-369], who was influenced by Hobbes.  Such arguments 
are  derived  primarily  from  historical  and  psychological  perspectives.    Mandeville  went 
further than Hobbes by stating that animals are born without compassion, yet kill only out of 
necessity for self defense or to eat; but: "Tis only Man, mischievous Man, that can make 
Death a Sport " [Mandeville 1732,178].   
            In the sixteenth century through the early eighteenth century, the common experience 
was that contradictory views were not tolerated.  Religion as ideology was supreme.  Any 
ideas  that  seemingly  contradicted  it  was  atheistic  and  had  to  be  condemned  [Redwood, 
1976,217].  "Clerics encouraged and praised natural philosophers if they worked within the 
framework  of  orthodox  Christian  apologia...    The  world  was  dominated  by  a  battle  for 
preferment  and  orthodoxy...  [Redwood  1976,31]."    Yet,  there  were  those  who  were  not 
confounded by the consensus based on ideological dominance--religious or otherwise.  For 
instance, Kepler, who developed the planetary theory, was critical of Aristotle's work which 
was at the centre of religious belief [Holton 1973,73]. 
            The new astronomy and new physics, advanced by Copernicus and Kepler, were at 
odds with the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic views of metaphysics and astronomy  [Finocchiaro 
1989,26].  Apart from Copernicus’ excommunication, the rejection of the new ideas by the 
Church  led  to  the  condemnation  of  Galileo  [Hull  1913,26-35],  who  had  advanced  the 
Copernican  system  by  means  of  a  new  mechanics  [Hull  1913,15].    While  the  earlier 
attachment to Aristotelian and Ptolemaic views was in itself not wrong, it is the refusal to 
allow  new  ideas  because  they  contradict  the  existing  orthodoxy  that  leads  us  into  an 
unnecessary battle of the minds.   
            Research in economics has shared similar experiences.  For instance, Bailey [1825]  
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had  criticized  Ricardo's  [1821]  definition  of  value  and  his  positions  on  interperiod 
comparison of the value of goods and an invariable standard of value.  Bailey [1825,72-
73,94-98] established that value is relative and not absolute, psychological and not physical, 
and that an invariable standard of value is impossible.  J. R. McCulloch, T. R. Malthus, and 
James  Mill,  were  among  many  who  attempted  in  vain  to defend the Ricardian position.  
Rather  than  recognize  the  contribution,  attempts  were  made  to  discredit  or  incorporate 
Bailey’s  work  into  the  Ricardian  framework.    Fortunately,  they  were  unsuccessful.  
However,  Bailey’s  work  remained  in  obscurity  until  its  rediscovery  in  1905  by  E.  R. 
Seligman.  This rediscovery led to its being reprinted by The London School of Economics 
in 1931 as No. 7 of its series of scarce tracts in economics and political science.  With this 
reprinting, references to his work gradually increased [Rauner 1961,1-5,118-120,138-141].  
            Ideology permeates scientific research and negatively affects the social process of 
adaptation.  Given the impact of scientific research on the lives of individuals, the "fairness” 
concept takes on added significance. 
 
5 - ASTRONOMY, ECONOMICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND PHYSICS 
  
            The  desire  of  early  economic  scholars  to  use  the  scientific  tools  is  quite 
understandable.  However, many times the inherent limitation of a particular method or its 
misapplication escapes normal attention.  Clearly, a very important case is the use by Adam 
Smith  of  the  universal  law  of  gravity  (the  "law  of  the  invisible  chain"  [Evensky 
1989,124,142]) developed by the mathematical physicist, Isaac Newton, to arrive at the "law 
of the invisible hand."  Newton had used Kepler's laws to demonstrate that "the sun exerts a 
force on each planet which varies in inverse proportion to the square of the distance of that 
planet from the sun" [Copleston 1985,148].  Having brought such major phenomena as the 
motions of the planets, the moon, and the sea under one mathematical law, it was suggested 
by Newton that all of Nature's phenomena of motion might be derived mathematically from 
the principles of mechanics [Copleston 1985,148].   
            Newton  had  validated  religious  society  with  his  work  [Redwood  1976,94-97.  
Similarly, Smith had hoped "to validate commercial society by demonstrating commercial 
society as the last in a series of successive stages through which the invisible chain of events  
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leads society (as if by an invisible hand) in its evolution toward an approximation of natural 
jurisprudence  and  thus  to  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds"  [Evensky  1989,125].    The 
dialectical syllogism of Adam Smith, whose work is the guiding principle for free market 
economists, leads into many fallacious modes of thought.
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"Every  individual  is  continually  exerting  himself  to  find  out  the  most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command.  It is his 
own advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he has in view.  But 
the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to 
prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society."  
[Smith 1776, Book IV, Chap. II] 
 
            According to Recktenwald [1978,72], there is an "invisible hand" which ensures that: 
 
"in a freely negotiated trade all sides guided by self-interest must benefit; 
otherwise no exchange would occur.  The accepted exchange value is then 
socially beneficial.  Both benefits and trade are the results of man's pursuit 
of  private  interest  and  his  propensity  to  bargain;  they  are  matters  of 
empirical observation and not of abstraction or ideology."  
 
            It  is  interesting  to  note  that  what  was  observed  by  Smith  was  the  opposite--the 
collaboration of a few at the expense of the others resulting in significantly disparate benefits 
to society [Evensky 1989,134-139].  To accept the conclusion arrived at by Smith, one must 
accept  the  many  hidden assumptions:  equal  talents,  equal  access, and equal endowment, 
which will produce a stalemate.  This stalemate would necessitate cooperation among the 
participants of the economic process to avoid a complete paralysis of the economic system; it 
is only in this setting that the benefit of the entire society will be served--"employment which 
is most advantageous to the society".  While it is maintained that Smith in his later life fully 
realized the failure of "the Invisible Hand" to function and that he was merely advocating an 
"ideal" system, many economists have adopted him as the patron saint of the free market 
paradigm and continue to hold steadfastly to that belief [Evensky 1989,143]. 
            In The History of Astronomy, Smith revealed his overwhelming admiration for Sir 
Isaac  Newton  [Smith  1967,65].    His  fascination  with  Newton's  scientific  achievement 
enabled him to overcome all consideration for Hobbes' remarkable exposition on human 
nature.  Smith was more convinced of the natural law principle of individual selfishness  
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which was expounded by Mandeville [1732] with such eloquence in unequivocal terms: 
 
. . . [Should one] examine into the Nature of Man, . . . [one] may observe that 
what renders him a Sociable Animal, consists not in his desire of Company, 
Good-nature, Pity, Affability, and other Graces of a fair Outside; but that his 
vilest and most hateful Qualities are the most necessary Accomplishments to 
fit him for the largest and, according to the World, the happiest and most 
fluorishing Societies. [Mandeville (1732)1924,Preface,p.4] 
 
            Smith recognized the similarity of Mandeville's position on human actions (that each 
person, unimpeded by any social constraint, following his/her natural impulse--own selfish 
interest--would  produce  results  that  appear  to  be  guided  by  some  force)  to  Newton's 
mechanics.  From this belief that the seeking of selfish passion was the most critical and 
natural human phenomenon (a philosophy of individualism with man as "a mechanism of 
interacting selfish passions" [Mandeville/Kaye (1732)1924,cxl]), it became quite easy for 
Smith to draw a parallel between political economy and natural science, and, hence, reject 
Hobbes' position on rights and responsibilities in a communal setting.   
            In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, it is fairly evident in that work that Smith was 
influenced by the philosophical views of the Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley).
3  Yet, 
for the description of the economic system, Smith chose to use Mandeville's views since they 
provided a neat comparison with the Newtonian concept.  Mandeville [1732,359] maintained 
that  the  destruction  of London by fire created benefits--the jobs created by the need for 
replacement of the items destroyed--that were greater than the cost.  Apparently, the work of 
an arsonist is of great benefit to society.  The dilemma for society is quite clear because 
reliance  on  that  model  one  would  have  to  accept  (although  quite  reluctantly)  that  the 
commitment of crimes do produce jobs, therefore society benefits in this process. 
             
6 - ECONOMICS - MODELING AND THEORY FORMULATION 
 
            Mirowski  [1989]  has  severely  criticized  economic  scholars  for  having  bogusly 
modeled economics on the physical sciences.  While not disagreeing with Mirowski, this 
author maintains that scholars should use whatever models that are available, provided they 
are adequate for the task at hand by providing a good understanding of new ideas. 
            Some new ideas are rejected not because the models employed are erroneous, but  
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because they contradict the existing orthodoxy.  Yet, other ideas are accepted although they 
ignore reality.  For instance, due to the religious establishment’s attachment to particular 
views of metaphysics and astronomy, Copernicus' work was considered heretical.  In order to 
minimize the negative view of Copernicus' work, "Osiander added an anonymous preface 
designed to shield it from persecution by claiming its central idea as a mere mathematical 
fiction  for  practical  use.    ...  [Owing  to  this  precaution]  the  book  escaped  official 
condemnation until long after [Copernicus' death], in Galileo's time" [Pledge 1966,37-38].   
            Although Copernicus relied upon mathematics and deduction, it was Tycho Brahe's 
vast  amount  of  accurate  observations  which  enabled  Johann  Kepler  to  formulate  the 
empirical laws of planetary orbit--the planetary theory as is known today [Pledge 1966,38-
39].    The  accurate  observations  of  Brahe  were  at  variance  with  every  philosophical, 
astronomical, and mathematical tradition of the past.  This fact forced Kepler to introduce 
ellipses into the heavens in place of Copernicus' circles [Drake 1973,20].  Copernicus was 
concerned with mathematical elegance, while "Kepler's Copernicanism was no less guided 
by  the  desire  to  discover  the  physics  of  the  heavens  than  his  sober  demand  for  precise 
mathematical fit between actual observations and the theory he proclaimed concerning the 
architecture of the universe" [Drake 1973,23].  The metaphysical implications of the new 
astronomy  and  new  physics  were  at  odds  with  the  Aristotelian  and  Ptolemaic  views  
[Finocchiaro 1989,26].  Accordingly, the Church refused to accept it.  Its rejection led to the 
condemnation of Galileo [Hull 1913,26-35], who advanced the Copernican system by means 
of a new mechanics--the law of falling bodies [Hull 1913,15]. 
            In economics, Walras [1926,69-70] attempted to ascribe to economics the features of 
the natural sciences (physics in particular) and made the exaggerated claims that value in 
exchange  (nominal  money  price)  is:  (1)  a  "natural  phenomenon"--natural  in  its  origin, 
manifestations  and  essence,  (2)  comparable  to  the  law  of  gravity,  and  (3)  a  branch  of 
mathematics (which has been neglected and left undeveloped by mathematicians).  While 
human beings cannot alter the planetary motions, they can certainly change their economic 
behaviour.    The  significance  of  this  latter  point  is  that,  human  beings  are not internally 
programmed to act in a predetermined manner.  The objects of physics have no emotions; 
therefore, they cannot and do not react to emotional stimuli.   
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            While  reality  must  not  be  denied,  experimentation  must  not  be  denied  since  its 
purpose is to enable society to cope with reality.  On such grounds, one can justify Walras' 
strenuous emphasis that a pure science of economics needed to be developed: 
 
Following . . . [the same procedure of the mathematical sciences] . . . the 
pure theory of economics ought to take over from experience certain type 
concepts, like those of exchange, supply, demand, market, capital, income, 
productive services and products.  From these real-type concepts the pure 
science of economics should then abstract and define ideal-type concepts 
in terms of which it carries on its reasoning.  The return to reality should 
not take place until the science is completed and then only with a view to 
practical applications.  Thus in an ideal market we have ideal prices which 
stand in an exact relation to an ideal demand and supply [Walras 1926,71]. 
 
            In astronomy, Kepler recognized that mathematical elegance had to bow to reality.  It 
was only by reverting to reality--the observations of Brahe--was Kepler able to arrive at the 
empirical laws of planetary orbit.  Galileo recognized that friction affected falling objects.  In 
order to understand how objects fall, abstraction (the removal of friction) by Galileo was 
necessary to get a better understanding of reality.  The abstraction enabled reconciliation 
between Galileo's theory and fact.  In spite of the use of abstraction, astronomers did not 
substitute abstraction for reality--a world in which friction exists.  
            One  cannot  find  fault  with  the  modeling  outlined  by  Walras.    However,  unlike 
astronomy, after the elegant scientific (mathematical) economic model was developed by 
Walras in economics, it was accepted as reality by many economists.  This author's view is 
shared by Coase [1992,714], who lamented on this issue in his Nobel Prize lecture.
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            It is the acceptance of an ideal in place of reality which produces much confusion in 
economics.  In the full cost versus marginal cost debate, Andrews' contribution--the theory of 
Normal  Cost  Pricing--was  denied  its  rightful  position  in  economic  theory  by  the 
marginalists, who marginalized the theory.  This denial occurred despite the fact that those 
economists, who believed in the works of Walras and Pareto, were the same economists who 
attempted to defame Andrews.  However, Andrews’ contribution was based upon concepts 
that were fundamental to the works of Pareto and Walras.  Pareto maintained that: (1) fixed 
expenses must be distributed over its output [1927,243,255,265-266], and (2) in the calculus 
of investment, fixed costs are provided for to solve the coefficient of production [1927,444- 
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445].  Walras [1926,252-254] provided a mathematical proof that the law of supply and 
demand ensures that the cost of production is the true value in equilibrium.  In continuing the 
discourse, it was maintained that where price is insufficient to cover depreciation, capital 
will  not  remain  intact  [Walras  1926,273].    Also,  it  was  emphasized  that  the  cost  of 
production controlled the quantity of output [Walras 1926,476]. 
            Andrews [1949] posed a challenge to the theory of imperfect competition which had  
been developed by Joan Robinson (1933) and Edward Chamberlin (1933).  At that time, 
neoclassical  price  theory  consisted  of  three  sub-theories:  (a)  perfect  competition,  (b) 
monopoly, and (c) imperfect competition.  The theory of imperfect competition had been 
developed to provide for the gap left by the first two sub-theories; common to all three sub-
theories were marginal cost pricing and the assumption of profit maximization.  So Andrews 
attack on imperfect competition drew the ire from the entire neoclassical school.   Andrews 
drew  attention  to  an  anomaly  in  the  theory  of  imperfect  competition;  its  underlying 
assumptions  were  inconsistent  with  empirical  findings,  therefore,  its  conclusions  were 
wrong.  In turn, Andrews offered a theory of manufacturing business which contained a 
theory of normal-cost pricing.  There were a multitude of empirical studies which supported 
Andrews' own empirical study [Lee and Irving-Lesserman 1992,280-281]; nevertheless, the 
criticism from the orthodox economists was incessant.   
            Andrews  and  his  followers  "were  usually  regarded  as  unimportant  heterodox 
contributors  by  the  majority  of  the  economic  profession."    What  was  at  stake  was  the 
orthodox belief of the maximizing behavior of firms.  Andrews' theory was accused of being 
neglectful of demand and competitive pressure [Mongin 1992,316,331,333].  Like Galileo 
who had received clerical advice concerning critics of his work, Andrews was asked by Roy 
Harrod, then editor of the Economic Journal, to avoid responding to A. Robinson (1950 and 
1951) and R. F. Kahn (1952), who were the most vocal critics of his work [Lee and Irving-
Lesserman 1992,291,298].   
            Besides  verbal  criticism,  Andrews  was  subjected  to  occupational  pressures.    The 
renewal of his Nuffield fellowship was threatened by eminent economists.  Also, his close 
associates were subjected to institutional pressure.  It was made clear to I. M. D. Little that 
he had to repudiate Andrews and all of his works or lose his promotion.  In a similar vein,  
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Galileo  had  been  advised  by  the  clergy  to  renounce  Copernicus  and  his  work  or  face 
excommunication.  Just as Osiander had deflected the heat from Copernicus' theory, so too 
did Elizabeth Brunner deflect the heat from Andrews' theory.  In an article she deliberately 
put the theory into neoclassical terminology.  The article was favorably received by Oxford 
economists and incorporated into neoclassical price theory rather than accepted on its own 
merit.  With the disguised fashion of presentation, Andrews' fellowship was saved [Lee and 
Irving-Lesserman 1992,298-299].   
            To the chagrin of society, consensual correctness has a tendency to prevail.  In a 
slightly different situation, it is noted that brilliant scholars such as Ludwig von Mises and 
Frederick von Hayek acted (to Coase's puzzlement [1992,715]) toward Oskar Lange's work 
as Ernst Mach did toward Einstein's work.  Mach, in his 1913 rejection (published in 1921 
five years after Mach's death) of Einstein's special theory of relativity, stated that it was 
merely dogmatic [Holton 1973,230].  Einstein's reply in this regard is very revealing [Holton 
1973,232-233]: 
 
... Mach rejected the special relativity theory passionately ....  The theory for 
him was inadmissibly speculative.  He did not know that this speculative 
character  belongs  to  Newton's  mechanics,  and  to  every  theory  which 
thought is capable of.  
 
            The criticism leveled at Oskar Lange's work on a socialist system by Ludwig von 
Mises [1935] and Frederick von Hayek [1940] would be in line with the Machian blow:  
Mises and Hayek maintained that an orderly socialist economy was impossible or at best 
unfeasible  [Heilbroner  1990,1111].    According  to  Mises  [1960,222]:  "[E]conomic 
calculation is not possible under socialism ... .”
5  Heilbroner [1990,1111] maintains that 
Mises  and  Hayek  scored  a  victory.    However,  this  victory  is  one  born  of  ideological 
dominance,  not  epistemological  relevance;  it  is  essentially  the  type  of  victory  that  was 
experienced over Copernicus and Galileo.   
            Once more Galileo's situation is instructive.  Galileo had set out to prove that weight 
and density have no direct effect on the speed of fall.  This hypothesis could only be proved 
in a nonexistent vacuum.  Yet, Galileo was able to establish by logical extrapolation from 
observational evidence to a nonexistent situation that all bodies fall at the same speed.  Thus,  
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Galileo was able to establish natural motion as a pure case of a concept - motion unimpeded 
by a resistant medium [McMullin 1967,16].  Yet to Galileo's predecessors at Paris, the idea 
(the elimination of the resistance to motion) never came upon them that the resultant of such 
an idealization would be natural motion [McMullin 1967,16].  The bases of the criticisms 
levelled  at  Galileo,  Einstein,  and  Lange  were  ideologically  motivated  and  not 
epistemologically related. 
 
7 - INSTRUMENTALISM 
 
            In the early development of mathematics from it empirical roots (e.g. surveying), a 
clear distinction was made between axioms, postulates, and assumptions.  An axiom was a 
self evident truth requiring no proof.  A postulate was evident but proof was optional.  An 
assumption was a condition imposed in a given situation for the purpose of analysis; in this 
case, the issue of truth was not of any concern. 
            "Hilbert asserted mathematics is a meaningless game played with meaningless marks 
on  paper...  [Bell  1951,38]."    David  Hilbert  introduced  formalism  in  which  assumptions, 
axioms and postulates are considered as interchangeable.  Since then, it is the view of most 
modern mathematician that mathematics is concerned with playing a game according to a 
given set of rules.  Such a view makes it necessary that non-mathematicians enquire into the 
'truth of mathematical propositions' [Bell 1951,23; Schwartz 1962,356-357]. 
            While Osiander engaged in deceptive language to lend an air of falsity to Copernicus' 
model, it was not a case of mathematical specification by Copernicus with indifference to 
empirical reality per se.   Osiander's intimation of falsity was out of sheer necessity to protect 
the scholar and preserve the work:  
 
Scholars will doubtless be shocked ... by the unsettling hypothesis of the 
earth's motion set forth in this book.  They should remember, however, that 
the astronomer is not concerned with the true causes of celestial motions.  
He is therefore free to adopt any hypothesis which may enable him to give a 
geometrical representation of the motions that have been observed in the 
past,  and  to  predict  the  motions  that  will  occur  in  the  future.    Such  a 
hypothesis need not be true or even probable; it is sufficient that it should 
lead to results in agreement with the facts of observation, and that it should 
be the simplest hypothesis capable of so doing. [Armitage 1957,66] 
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            While Friedman's Positivism [1953] is a version of ‘instrumentalism’ as defined by 
Popper [1959], apparently Osiander and Hilbert were potential sources of influence upon 
Friedman’s [1953,14] thinking as the following passage reveals:   
 
"... the relation between the significance of a theory and the 'realism' of its 
assumptions  is  almost  the  opposite.    ...    Truly  important  and  significant 
hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate 
descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant 
the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions ...  ."   
 
            Early debates on this issue have recognized the impropriety of such a position.  For 
instance,  although  the  mathematical  astronomy  of  Ptolemy  had  proven  to  be  far  more 
predictively successful than the physical astronomy of Aristotle, the latter was considered 
superior to Ptolemy’s because it provided a better explanation of the working of the cosmos 
[McMullin 1967,13]. 
            The falsity of axioms does appear in the literature, but it is in context with the fact 
that axioms for entirely different systems (e.g. Euclidean versus non-Euclidean systems) are 
invariably  false  for each other [Pledge 1966,189; Flew 1989,426-427].  The situation of 
Galileo is quite instructive in this regard.  Galileo had chosen to take an opposite position to 
Aristotle.  Based upon observations that while a body falls in one medium, it rises in another, 
Galileo  was  able  to  demonstrate  the contradictory consequences of Aristotle's claim that 
speed was inversely proportional to density.  With this evidence and additional observations 
on dense media, Galileo established that bodies of very different density fall at quite different 
speeds, and in air they fall at almost the same speed [McMullin 1967,15].   
            While,  the  role  of  intuition  cannot  be  denied,  it  should  not  be  confused  with 
protective (sunk cost) distortion.  Unequivocally like Galileo, Friedman has the scholar’s 
right to take an opposite view to the perceived reality that is intuitively appealing.  However, 
to  maintain  that  position,  when  the  evidence  based  upon  his  own  model  design  fails  to 
support his theory, is simply dogmatic.
6  Boland [1979] has defended Friedman’s adherence 
to an instrumentalist epistemology; that is: it is only prediction, and not explanation, that is 
needed for policy prescription.  However, economic policy based on monetarism, which is 
ideologically based has had calamitous results (e.g., bankruptcies and unemployment).    
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            Since ideologies influence the manner in which social resources may be expended or 
distributed [Wuthnow 1987,345], the consequences due to attributing mechanical causalities 
to living processes are quite devastating for citizens in many countries [Weekes 1998].   The 
free  market/capitalism  orthodoxy,  shareholder  wealth  maximization,  profit  maximization, 
the general equilibrium model of economics based on physics, and instrumentalism as the 
preferred epistemology owe their elevated positions to ideological dominance.  There is no 
empirical evidence to sustain the position that society is better off with a free/unregulated 
market than with a regulated market in which there is guided cooperation for the benefit of 
the members of society.  The historical evidence speaks for itself. 
 
8 - THE FREE MARKET AND THE REGULATED MARKET  
 
            The  evidence  is  quite  clear  that  both  the  UK  and  the  US  have  moved  from 
free/unregulated markets to regulated markets.   For instance, in England, the Bubble Act of 
1720 was enacted to address the abuse in the securities market.  After the repeal of the Act of 
1720 in 1825, there has been a succession of British Companies Acts.  After the Wall Street 
Crash  in  1929,  the  US  Congress  enacted  the  Securities  Act  of  1933  and  The  Securities 
Exchange  Act  of  1934,  which  brought  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  into 
existence.  Many countries today have their own Securities Commission.  In both the UK and 
the US, there are many regulatory agencies. 
            Monopoly is the natural tendency in a free market.  This condition, in the US in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, resulted in the regulation of the free market with the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.  The latter act created the Federal Trade 
Commission  and  authorized  the  Department  of  Justice  to  guard  against  monopoly  by 
prosecuting antitrust cases [Pfiffner and Presthus 1967,365].  Standard Oil Company (1911) 
and American Telephone and Telegraph (1984) were broken up due to antitrust action. Given 
the  emphasis  on  deregulation,  from  1990  to  1998  the  value  of  worldwide  mergers  and 
acquisitions  is  estimated  at  $2.5  trillion,  with  64%  of  such  activities  in  the  US 
[http://www.soutcentre.org, 2000]. 
            It is advanced that the free market increases competition producing price reductions 
to the benefit of consumers.  However, Veblen [1904,28-32] better describes the competition  
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resulting from the free market: Firms operate with business strategies aimed at manipulation 
and control of economic spaces for monetary and not industrial benefit.  Business leaders 
will circumvent or even sabotage industrial efficiency if their monetary gains are greater 
when such strategies are employed.  What is witnessed is anticompetitive behavior (e.g., 
Microsoft  Corporation).  To  restore  some  form  of  competition,  regulation  is  undertaken.  
Today, it is a regulated market (with more or less regulation from one time to another) that 
exists,  and  not  a  free  market.    In  business  education,  ideology  is  accepted  in  place  of 
epistemological relevance.  
 




            "Men  [and  women]  are  guided  in  their  moral  responses  and  intuitions  by  the 
inherited, accepted suggestiveness of the concepts by which they live [Gellner 1988,124]."  
The learning process enables human adaptation, that is the ability to cope with, if not control, 
the environment and increase its yield for the benefit of society.  The progress of society is 
directly linked to the learning process; therefore, any threat of damage to the learning process 
must be repelled vigorously.  It is quite evident that society adopted the scientific method in 
its attempt to reduce the random approach to discovery through the development of logical 
theories and laws.  Likewise, society has adopted schools of higher learning as vehicles for 
accumulating and disseminating information about the natural and social environments.   
            Given  the  impact  of  higher  education  on  the  lives  of  individuals,  the  "fairness 
concept"  in  the  educational  process  takes  on  added  significance.    The  discussion  which 
follows is intended to be a general comment on higher education; however, the business 
school is chosen as a working example because the average individual is quite familiar with 
the immediate effects of business decisions on their daily lives.  What is said of business 
education holds with equal force for education in the natural and social sciences. 
            The business school is the vehicle for accumulating and disseminating information 
about the business environment.   The intent of this institutional arrangement is the desire to 
minimize  the  cost  to  society  by  eliminating  the  need  for  trial  and  error  in  the  business 
environment.  Ideally, the business educator works with a set of concepts and discovers new 
combinations of elements.  This aspect of education, known as research, is protected by  
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institutional guarantees.  However, in the bid for institutional visibility, research takes on a 
different twist.  The ease of publication takes precedence over epistemological relevance.  
That is, research in support of the existing orthodoxy (e.g., maximizing monetary returns, 
shareholder wealth maximization, and the free market effects of restructuring leading back to 
general  equilibrium)  are  easier  to  publish  than  findings  which  challenge  the  existing 
orthodoxy.    Such  an  approach  can  only  lead  to  the  retardation  of  social  progress.  
Indubitably, society is the victim of such an ill-conceived plan - institutional visibility.   
            In general, business schools have failed to establish the importance of human social 
responsibility--the  "fairness  concept"  is  ignored.    In  business  education,  corporate  social 
responsibility appears to be of little or no significance.  Invariably, emphasis is placed on 
marketing which eliminates the competition and downsizing/cost-cutting which decimates 
the  workforce.    There  is  little  concern  to  find  means  to  augment  the  workforce  while 
increasing its productivity and to master technology to limit its devastating effects on the 
workforce.  While technology is not evil, the failure to master and control its use can create 
havoc for much of the labor force.   
            Society, per se, cannot improve itself.  Society is a collection of individuals bound 
together by a common culture; therefore, improvements in society can be brought about only 
through the collective acts of the individuals who comprise that society.   If institutions of 
business  education  foster  selfish  motivation  -  monetary  returns  -  as  the  basis  of  human 
conduct rather than individual contribution to the betterment of society embedded in the 
"fairness concept", then the natural consequence would manifest it self in the behavioral 
patterns  of  the  graduates  of  these  institutions.    Obviously,  the  end  product  of  aberrant 
learning  is  aberrant  behavior.      Unmistakably,  there  is  clear  evidence  that  the  lesson  of 
human conduct on the basis of selfish motivation is well learned and effectively exercised in 
corporate life by graduates of the business schools.   
            It  is  interesting  to  note  that  corporate  management  -  yes,  the  business  school 
graduates  -  maintain  that  they  are  guided  by  the  principle  of  shareholder  wealth 
maximization,  which  necessitates  optimizing  the monetary  returns  to  the  firm.    It  is  the 
advocacy of profit maximization and the invisible hand of competition (ideologically based 
theories and propositions of self-interest) that inflicts the greatest damage to society.  This  
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condition holds because little or no attention is paid to the augmentation of the workforce 
while  increasing  the  productivity  of  the  socio-economic  system.    The  burden  of 
responsibility  falls  squarely  upon  the  business  faculty  to  re-examine  the  theories  and 
propositions which espouse self-interest, before handing them to their students as divine 
truths.  Critical action is needed to insure that the "fairness concept" is recognized, because 
the  business  graduates,  in  their  desire  to  excel,  execute  or  implement  the  self-interest 
ideology with great precision.  They feel morally justified as they are acting in accordance 
with the natural law and possibly totally oblivious of the grave consequences of their actions. 
 
10 - OPERATIONALIZING THE FAIRNESS CONCEPT 
 
            Many  research  studies  are  not  published,  simply  because  they  are  critical  of  the 
existing orthodoxy.  Consensual correctness determines what is published.  This condition is 
debilitating for the further development of society--the growth of knowledge.  To overcome 
this problem, the "fairness concept" is offered.  No researcher wishes to be considered a 
failure;  and  given  a  very  scholarly  effort,  no  researcher  should  be  considered  a  failure.  
Unfortunately, once a researcher has established a foothold in a given area, he/she feels 
obligated to defend that position at all cost lest he/she be discredited in the eyes of the 
scientific  community.    Perhaps,  the  most  effective  way  to  operationalize  the  "fairness 
concept" would be to:  
 
(a)   review  anomalous  research  findings  critically,  not  from  the  standpoint  of 
discrediting  them  but  from  the  lessons  which  can  be  learned  -  incorrect  model 
specifications  and/or  methods  or  models  which  indicate  erroneous  research 
directions;  
 
(b)   define failure in research not as having developed a failed theory but in defending 
that theory on the grounds of conventional wisdom - consensual correctness,  
 
(c)   encourage researchers to accept critical reviews of their research without having to 
feel that their research is deficient, and  
 
(d)    evaluate research on the basis of "what is said" rather than "who said what".  
 
            The "fairness concept" underscores the need for every effort to be made by members 
of the research community to remove the unnecessary burden (the fear of failure emerging  
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from  the  pressure  of  consensual  correctness)  which  each  researcher  carries  into  each 
research project.  To ensure high quality research, no restriction should be placed on the 
methodology to be employed in the conduct of research.  However, each researcher has the 
responsibility to accept the limitation of his/her model.  Teachers would be in a much better 
position to differentiate and explain what is ideologically based (and why it is accepted in a 
given  environment)  from  what  is  epistemologically  relevant.    In  this  process,  it  may  be 
possible that society may rid itself of The Legacy of Mandeville's Paradox. 
 
11 - CONCLUSION 
 
            Throughout history, there is a continuing trend of ideological dominance in scholarly 
investigations despite the recognition that epistemological relevance is necessary for solid 
social  progress.    To  the  detriment  of  society,  national  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  are 
affected by this imbalance in scholarly investigations.  The study has emphasized the social 
imperative to institute the concept of fairness in order to minimize the negative impact of 
ideology.    
            To  overcome  this  negative  imbalance  between  ideology  and  epistemology, 
acceptance of the "fairness concept" is essential.  It is important to stress that each entry in 
the research effort, regardless of the methodology used or the findings, adds to the body of 
knowledge.    Though  in  some  cases,  this  contribution  would  be  in  a  falsification  sense; 
nevertheless, negative types of research do provide a basis for identifying and testing the 
epistemological relevance of other models and is therefore useful.  To the benefit of society, 
adoption of the "fairness concept" would minimize the importance of consensual correctness 



















1       It was quite clear at that time that: 
 
 
               No natural philosopher interested in the mathematical problems of force and gravity could afford to 
omit some general account of the applicability of his ideas to the God-filled world of his contemporaries.  
If he preferred not to, there would have been many who were all to willing to construe his meaning 
unfavourably.  Newton was aware of the danger, and fought to allay the fears of clerics and reactionaries, 
both in his general scholia, and in his letters to the First Boyle lecturer. 
      In Newton's opening paragraph to the published correspondence can be found his often quoted remark 
that he hoped his theory would be useful to Christian apologists.   ... It was only through  ...  conscious and 
concerted work that the Newtonian theorists were able to consolidate the position of their ideas at the 
centre of English metaphysics; it was only through a programme of successful popularization and concern 
with the wider ramifications of the theory that Newton became an important part of the argument from 
design, able to add weight to the wisdom of God and his world.  [Redwood 1976,94] 
      Through his study of ancient philosophy, theology and the classics, Newton had managed to concern 
himself with the whole gamut of contemporary intellectual problems: by careful and cautious publications 
he had preserved a reputation not only as a natural philosopher, but also as a Christian.  ... [A]t the heart of 
Newton lay a fundamental belief in the power and wisdom of God, an omnipotent, interventionist Deity 
who influenced everyone's lives.  [Redwood 1976,97] 
 
2       In  accordance  with  the  Aristotelian  terminology,  the  premises  in  this  syllogism  are  only  probable. 
[Armstrong 1947,7]  
 
3       A careful reading of  the F. B. Kaye Edition of Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices, 
Publick Benefits [1924] would lead one to conclude that Smith was heavily influenced by Mandeville.  
Similarly, one could infer such a conclusion from the work of Copleston [(1963/64) 1985]. 
 
At this stage it is important to trace the philosophical origins of the idea which Adam Smith espoused.  
Mirowski [1989,pp.165-168] maintains that Smith was heavily influenced by Francois Quesnay and the 
Physiocrats.  From a systems approach Mirowski's view holds; however, as far as the evidence analyzed by 
this author, Smith's view is an amalgamation of two philosophical points of view--that of the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury,  Anthony Ashley (1671-1713) and Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733).  These philosophical 
views are to be found in the Earl of Shaftesbury's Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, and 
the criticism of Shaftesbury by Mandeville's The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices Public Benefits.  
Ashley's as well as Mandeville's positions follow, respectively: 
 
Ashley  -  We know that every creature has a private good and interest of his own, which 
nature  has  compelled  him  to  seek.    ...[A]  well  ordered  concern  for  ...  [one's]  own 
preservation  on  the  part  of  individuals  contributes  to  the  common  good  [Copleston, 
1985,172-173]. 
 
Mandeville - ... [I]t is vice (that is, self-regarding affections and actions) which benefits 
society.  A society which was endowed with all the 'virtues' would be a static and stagnant 
society.    It  is  when individuals, seeking their own enjoyment and comfort, contrive or 
promote new inventions and when, by luxurious living, they circulate capital, that society 
progresses  and  flourishes.    In  this  sense  private  vices  are  public  benefits  [Copleston, 
1985,p.177]. 
 
According to the introduction provided by Kaye [Mandeville (1732)1924,ciii-cv], Mandeville had drawn 
from such predecessors as Pierre Bayle and La Rochefocauld. 
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4       What is studied [in economics] is a system which lives in the minds of economists but not on earth. [Coase 
1992,714] 
 
. . . [T]he infamous Coase theorem [which is based on zero transactions costs], named and 
formulated by George Stigler, . . . is based on work of mine.  [T]he Coase theorem follows 
from the standard assumptions of economic theory.  Its logic cannot be questioned, only its 
domain (Stigler 1989,631-3). I do not disagree with Stigler.  However, I tend to regard the 
Coase theorem as a stepping stone on the way to an analysis of an economy with positive 
transactions costs.  The . . . Coase Theorem . . . undermines the Pigovian system.  Since 
standard  economic  theory  assumes  transaction  costs  to  be  zero,  the  Coase  theorem 
demonstrates that the Pigovian solutions are unnecessary in these circumstances. . . . . My 
conclusion: let us study the world of positive transactions cost. [Coase 1992,717] 
    [T]ransaction costs affect not only contractual arrangements, but also what goods and 
services are produced.  Not to include transaction costs in the theory leaves many aspects of 
the working of the economic system unexplained, including the emergence of the firm, but 
much else besides [Coase 1992,716]. 
 
5      Mises’ position is similar to that of Ptolemy.  Although knowing that the Greeks had realized that:       (1) 
Euclid's parallel axiom is a pure assumption and not an axiom and (2) the possibility of four dimensional 
space,  Ptolemy  attempted  to prove that the first was an axiom and the latter was impossible [Pledge 
1966,180]. 
 
6       While not directed at Friedman, the poignant and revealing admonition of Samuels [1991,514-515] is a 
clear stand against the steadfast adherence to a preferred epistemology. 
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